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Allen v. Wright: Standing Beyond the Bounds of Article III
Sections 501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) mandate
that racially discriminatory schools be denied both tax-exempt status and eligi-
bility for tax-deductible contributions under section 170 of the Code.1 To imple-
ment these Code sections the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued
guidelines for determining whether a private school seeking tax-exempt status is
racially discriminatory.2 These guidelines, however, have proved ineffective-
1. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2032 (1983); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2
C.B. 230.
I.R.C. § 501(a) (1982) provides: "An organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section
401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle ...."
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) provides: "The following organizations are referred to in subsection
(a): . . .Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable,. . . or educational purposes,. . . no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activi-
ties of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, .. and
which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign .. "
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1982) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable con-
tribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year."
I.R.C § 170(c)(2) (1982) defines a "charitable contribution" as "a contribution or gift to or for
the use of. . .a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation. . . organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) ...."
The IRS ruled in 1971 that §§ 501(a) and 501(c)(3) required it to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Until 1965 the IRS had granted
tax exemptions to all educational institutions that satisfied the requirements enumerated in§ 501(c)(3) without regard to whether the institution was racially discriminatory. From 1965 to
1967 it imposed a freeze on applications for tax-exempt status from racially discriminatory schools.
From 1967 to 1970 the IRS approved applications for tax-exempt status from racially discrimina-
tory schools unless it appeared that such schools were so connected with the state that their actions
would be considered discriminatory state action and, therefore, unconstitutional. Green v. Kennedy,
309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
In 1970 the IRS announced that it no longer legally could justify granting tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6790. The reasoning behind this policy change was revealed in a 1971
revenue ruling. The IRS had determined that section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that an exempt organ-
ization be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational pur-
poses" was intended to reflect the common-law notion of charity. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B.
230. This determination led the IRS to conclude that this section was designed to benefit only those
organizations that operated as common-law charities. Common-law charities were subject to the
restriction that their activities be consistent with public policy. Because the operation of a racially
discriminatory private school violated the federal public policy against discrimination in education,
the IRS ruled that such schools failed to qualify for tax exemptions and that donations to such
schools were not tax deductible. Id. The IRS borrowed the reasoning of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mern.
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), in making this ruling. See infra notes 13-19 and
accompanying text.
2. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The 1972 guidelines were modeled after a permanent
injunction issued by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub noa. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
The injunction issued in Green enjoined and restrained the IRS from approving applications for
tax-exempt status for private schools in Mississippi unless the school had publicized its policy of
racial nondiscrimination in a manner reasonably effective in bringing the policy to the attention of
minority groups; referred to its policy of nondiscrimination in its brochures, catalogues, and other
advertisements; and certified that it had made no statements or taken any actions qualifying its
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even schools that have been adjudged discriminatory have been able to satisfy
the guidelines and maintain their tax-exempt status.3 In 1977 parents of black
schoolchildren filed suit to compel the IRS to adopt more stringent guidelines. 4
Their case reached the Supreme Court as Allen v. Wright,5 but the Court de-
clined to reach the merits of the case; the Court held that neither of the two
injuries alleged by plaintiffs was sufficient to give them standing to challenge the
policy of nondiscrimination. The school also must have provided the IRS with data on the racial
composition of its student body, applicants for admission, and faculty and administrative staff, on
the amount of scholarship and loan funds awarded and the racial composition of students who
received such awards; and on whether any of its incorporators, founders, board members, or donors
of land or buildings were organizations or members of organizations that had as a goal the mainte-
nance of segregation in school education. Id. at 1179-80. The injunction defined a policy of racial
nondiscrimination as meaning that the school "admitt[ed] the students of any race to all the rights,
privileges, programs and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school"
and did not discriminate on the basis of race "in the administration of educational policies, applica-
tions for admission, . . .scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and extra-curricular pro-
grams." Id. at 1179. Surprisingly, the injunction did not expressly require the IRS to determine
that a school actually had implemented a policy of racial nondiscrimination before granting the
school tax-exempt status. For a discussion of the facts of Green, see infra notes 15-22 and accompa-
nying text.
The first set of guidelines appeared in 1972. See Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. These
guidelines were replaced by slightly stricter guidelines in 1975. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B.
587. The 1975 guidelines generally require that schools adopt and publicize their adoption of a
policy of nondiscrimination. This policy must be included in the school's charter and made known
to the community served by the school. Schools are required to provide the IRS with a statistical
breakdown by race of their faculty, student body, administrative staff, and scholarship and loan
recipients. They also must state whether any of their incorporators, founders, board members, or
donors of land or buildings had or have as an objective the maintenance of segregated education.
Schools also must keep documents verifying their compliance with the guidelines and annually cer-
tify their compliance under penalty of perjury.
3. In statements before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated:
mhe Service's procedures [are] ineffective in identifying schools which in actual operation
discriminate against minority students ....
A clear indication that our rules require strengthening is the fact that a number of
private schools continue to hold tax exemption even though they have been held by Federal
courts to be racially discriminatory. This position is indefensible.
Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House CommL on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The IRS attempted to revise its guidelines in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg.
37,296 (1978) (proposed Aug. 21, 1978). After evaluating public response to the proposed revisions,
the IRS released a new set of guidelines that were to take effect on January 1, 1980. These guidelines
established that a school which was formed or substantially expanded during public school desegre-
gation and had an insignificant minority enrollment would be classified "reviewable" and rebuttably
presumed discriminatory if the IRS determined that its creation or expansion was related in-fact to
the desegregation of public schools in the area. Such schools were to be provided an opportunity to
explain their low minority enrollment and to document their efforts to recruit minority students
before being characterized as racially discriminatory. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979) (proposed Feb.
12, 1979); see generally Hearings, supra, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service) (explaining what proposed guidelines would require and how they would
be implemented). Congress blocked the implementation of these guidelines, however, by amending
the Treasury Appropriations Bill to withhold funds for their enforcement until October 1980. See
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74,
§§ 103, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 577 (1979); Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3323 n.16 (1984).
Similar spending restrictions, including a restriction on use of funds to enforce court orders entered
after August 1978, continued in effect until January 1, 1984. Id.
4. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
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IRS guidelines. 6
This Note reviews the Supreme Court's discussion of standing in Wright 7
and analyzes the Court's application of its standing test to the facts of Wright.8
The Note criticizes the Court's overly stringent application of the causation ele-
ment of its standing test.9 It concludes that the Court's decision unduly impairs
access to the courts by victims of unlawful government conduct and leaves the
government free to lend substantial support to racially discriminatory
institutions.10
The IRS guidelines challenged by the Wright plaintiffs were adopted in
1975 to effectuate an IRS ruling that a school applying for tax-exempt status
must demonstrate that it admits the students of any race to all the rights, privi-
leges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in
administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and
loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs." This
ruling was made in 1971 following the IRS's announcement in 1970 that it could
"no longer legally justify" its former policy permitting racially discriminatory
schools to be granted tax-exempt status. 12 The 1970 policy change was made
after the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v.
Kennedy13 preliminarily enjoined the IRS from continuing to grant tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory schools in Mississippi. 14
The district court decided the merits of Green in 1971.15 Plaintiffs in Green
6. Id. at 3326. For a description of the challenged guidelines, see supra note 3. The Court
concluded that the first injury alleged was not judicially cognizable and that the second failed be-
cause it was not "fairly traceable" to the IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools. See infra text accompanying note 33.
7. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
11. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3319.
12. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6790; see supra note I (explaining basis of IRS policy change).
13. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970).
14. The Green court issued its preliminary injunction on January 12, 1970. Id. The IRS an-
nounced its new policy on July 10, 1970. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) % 6790.
15. The district court rejected the argument that the IRS's reversal of its pre-1970 policy in the
course of the litigation rendered the case moot for lack of a "case or controversy." A defendant, the
court stated, does not render a case moot merely by "promising to conform to plaintiff's wishes."
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1170 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971). The court foresaw the danger that in the absence of a court order the IRS might change
its policy again. Critics of the decision, however, have charged that the district court ignored article
III's "case or controversy" requirement. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Chal-
lenges of Tax Exemptions For Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 458-59
(1984).
The validity of the district court's concern was confirmed in 1982 when the IRS again reversed
its position and announced that it would "no longer revoke or deny tax-exempt status for...
organizations on grounds that they [do not] conform with.. . fundamental public policies." Legis-
lation to Deny Tax Exemption to Racially Discriminatory Private School Hearings on S. 2024
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). Not surprisingly, this reversal
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were parents of black schoolchildren who sought to enjoin the IRS from grant-
ing tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi.
They alleged that the IRS's pre-1970 policy was unconstitutional and contrary
to statute. 16 In light of the federal policy against racial segregation in schools,
the court held that the Code's provisions could not be construed in a manner
that would give racially discriminatory schools the same tax benefits given to
charitable organizations. 17
The court made it clear that any contrary interpretation of the Code would
"raise serious constitutional questions": "If the [IRS] had not adopted its July,
1970, interpretation, and if this court had acquiesced in the pre-1970 inter-
pretation, we would in all likelihood have been required by the Constitution to
enter a decree ordering the Service to cease violating plaintiffs' constitutional
rights."18 The court issued a permanent injunction allowing the IRS to grant
tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi only if the school had publi-
cized its adoption of a policy of nondiscrmination and had provided the IRS
with sufficient information to determine whether the school actually had estab-
lished such a policy. 19 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district
court's opinion.20 Plaintiffs in Green reopened the case in 1976 alleging that the
IRS was failing to comply with the court's injunction.2 1 Wright was filed shortly
thereafter; the United States District Court for the District of Columbia consoli-
came about during the pendency of Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), in
which plaintiff university asserted a right to tax-exempt status despite its religiously mandated ra-
cially discriminatory policies. Again, the IRS argued that its reversal made the case moot and urged
dismissal. The Supreme Court, however, declined to vacate the case as moot. Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982). William Coleman, Jr., was invited to present arguments in favor
of the IRS's former position to preserve the adversarial nature of the case. Id. McCoy and Devins
also have criticized the Court's refusal to hold Bob Jones moot. McCoy & Devins, supra, at 464.
The flip-flops in IRS policy during the pendency of Green and Bob Jones illustrate the danger of
allowing cases to be rendered moot based on administrative changes of position on issues not gov-
erned by express statutory language or judicial decisions. The viewpoint advocated by McCoy and
Devins would allow the IRS to escape litigation of an issue ad infinitum simply by announcing a
policy change each time it is faced with hostile litigation.
Ten days after the announcement that the IRS no longer would deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools, the Reagan Administration proposed legislation that ex-
pressly would have denied tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. S. 2024, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in [1982] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCII) 1 6155. Congress responded
to the proposed bill by asserting that current Code provisions already prohibited the granting of such
exemptions. S. Con. Res. 59, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The Supreme Court settled the disagree-
ment by holding in Bob Jones that current statutes did require the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2030-31.
16. Plaintiffs alleged that granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools violated
§§ 501 and 170 of the Code, Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Green
v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398
U.S. 956 (1970).
17. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
18. Id. at 1171.
19. Id. at 1179-80; see supra note 2.
20. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
21. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright,
104 S. CL 3315 (1984).
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dated the two actions in April 1977.22
Plaintiffs in Wright were black parents whose children attended public
school in desegregating school systems. The parents sought an injunction
prohibiting the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools and requiring the IRS to adopt more rigid guidelines for deter-
mining whether a school was racially discriminatory. They alleged that IRS
guidelines permitted schools to acquire tax-exempt status "'merely on the basis
of adopting and certifying-but not implementing-a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion,'" and thus did not comply with section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that ra-
cially discriminatory schools be denied tax-exempt status.23 The essence of
plaintiffs' complaint was that the grant of federal tax exemptions to such schools
unconstitutionally supported racially segregated educational institutions by fos-
tering and encouraging the "organization, operation and expansion" of racially
segregated schools for "white children avoiding attendance in desegregating
public school districts."
24
The district court dismissed the case in November 1979 on the grounds that
the Wright plaintiffs lacked standing and had presented a nonjusticiable issue.25
The Green plaintiffs' action survived, however, because the court ruled that they
had standing to litigate their rights under the injunction.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the dismissal of Wright.27 The court of appeals relied on the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Green and the Supreme Court's decisions in Gil-
more v. City of Montgomery28 and Norwood v. Harrison2 9 in holding that the
Wright plaintiffs had standing. The court categorized Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization,3 0 a Supreme Court decision that weighed
against granting standing, as part of a "divergent" line of precedent that was the
"wrong frame" for the Wright case. 31
The Supreme Court rejected the analysis of the court of appeals. Applying
a three-pronged constitutional test of standing,3 2 the Court concluded that
22. See id.
23. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3321 (quoting appellants' brief).
24. Id. at 3322.
25. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
26. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104
S. Ct. 3315 (1984). The Green plaintiffs ultimately were successful in getting most of the relief they
requested. See id.
27. Id. at 838.
28. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
29. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
30. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of the facts of Simon, see infra text accompanying
notes 59-61.
31. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 828-29 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright,
104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). The court of appeals also held that the issues raised in Wright were justicia-
ble. Id. at 838.
32. See infra text accompanying note 33. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court's
standing test is intended to determine whether the issue before the Court is being presented in the
context of a case or controversy. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW § 3-18, at 80
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plaintiffs had failed to allege an injury that gave them standing to challenge the
IRS guidelines. The Court's standing test required that (1) the injury suffered by
plaintiffs be "distinct and palpable," (2) that the injury be "fairly traceable" to
the challenged conduct, and (3) that relief from the injury be "likely" to result
from a favorable decision. 33 The first prong requires that the injury suffered by
the plaintiff be judically cognizable. The second and third prongs form the cau-
sation element of the standing inquiry-they are not satisfied unless the plain-
tiff's injury was caused by the defendant's conduct. Thus these three prongs
ensure the existence of a genuine case or controversy.34
As read by the Court, the complaint in Wright described two injuries result-
ing from the IRS's allegedly unlawful conduct: "First, . . . [plaintiffs] are
harmed by the mere fact of Government financial aid to discriminatory private
schools. Second,. . . the federal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools in their communities impair their ability to have their public
schools desegregated." ' 35 The Court held that the first injury was not judicially
cognizable. Interpreted as "a claim. . . to have the Government avoid the vio-
lation of law,"'36 the first injury asserted a right that the Court refused to recog-
nize as a basis for standing. The Court stated that the" 'assertion of a right to a
particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by
acting differently, can not alone satisfy the requirements of Article III without
draining those requirements of meaning.' "37
The Court also interpreted the first injury as presenting a claim of stigmati-
zation resulting from racial discrimination. Although the Court recognized this
type of injury as sufficient to confer standing, it concluded that stigmatic injury
conferred standing only on persons who alleged that they personally had been
denied equal treatment. The Court believed that to allow this type of injury to
confer standing on persons who did not allege a personal denial of equal treat-
ment would "transform the federal court into '. . . a vehicle for the vindication
of. . .concerned bystanders'" and would extend standing to all members of
the racial group against which the government allegedly was discriminating.38
(1978). Thus, the doctrine of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient stake in the out-
come of a controversy to pursue judicial resolution. Id. § 3-17, at 79. It has been suggested that the
Constitution's requirement of a case or controversy is not a requirement that a party have a personal
stake in the controversy. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Contitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
33. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3325.
34. See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97.
35. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3326.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3327 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982)).
38. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
Generally, private litigants do not have standing to assert the rights of others. For example, in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Sierra Club was denied standing to assert the rights
of third parties who used Mineral King Valley. The Club would have had to allege that its members
visited and recreated in the valley to have standing. This third-party rule, however, is a "'rule of
practice'" rather than a "'principle ordained by the Constitution' "; the Court has recognized ex-
ceptions to the rule in a few situations. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-26, at 103 (quoting United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). For example, the Court has allowed persons who them.
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Blacks in one state would have standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of
schools in other states: a result that article III does not permit.
The Court characterized plaintiffs' second injury as "not only judicially
cognizable," but also "one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system." 39 The diminished ability of plaintiffs' children to receive an education
in a racially integrated school was a distinct and palpable injury that satisfied the
first prong of the Court's standing test. This injury, however, did not satisfy the
Court's causation requirement. The Court stated that the line of causation be-
tween this injury and the IRS's grant of tax exemptions to racially discrimina-
tory schools was too attenuated to form a basis for standing; it characterized
plaintiffs' injury as "highly indirect" and "result[ing] from the independent ac-
tion of some third party not before the court. ' 4° The required line of causation
would be present only if plaintiffs had alleged that "there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in [their] communities
for withdrawal of [tax-exempt status] to make an appreciable difference in pub-
lic-school integration. 4 1 Concerned about this injury's redressability-the like-
lihood that a favorable decision would provide relief-the Court noted that it
was "entirely speculative" whether withdrawal of tax exemptions from racially
discriminatory schools would affect public school integration.4 2
The Court underscored its conclusion that the line of causation drawn was
insufficient by applying the doctrine of separation of powers to its analysis of
article III requirements. In the Court's view the proper role of the federal courts
does not include deciding claims such as the one brought in Wright: "The Con-
stitution. . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch,
the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' We could not rec-
ognize [plaintiffs'] standing . . . without running afoul of that structural
principle." 43
Justices Brennan and Stevens filed dissenting opinions.44 Justice Brennan
criticized the Court's use of generalizations about separation of powers to cloud
the standing issue and to avoid recognizing of the true nature of the injuries
alleged. He did not discuss the Court's refusal to find standing as to the first
injury, but attacked the Court's conclusion that granting tax benefits to racially
discriminatory private schools did not detrimentally affect the integration of
public schools. Justice Brennan noted that "[c]ommonsense alone would recog-
selves have suffered an injury to litigate the rights of third-parties when it would be difficult or
impossible for those persons to assert their own rights. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). It also has recognized an exception when a special relationship existed between the plaintiff
and the third-party whose rights the plaintiff sought to assert. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 32, §§ 3-26 to -27, at 103-12 (discussing the
Court's willingness to grant certain parties surrogate standing).
39. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 3328.
42. Id. at 3328-29.
43. Id. at 3330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
44. Wright was a five-to-three decision. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority.
Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' dissent, and Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent.
Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.
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nize that the elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private
schools would serve to lessen the impact that those institutions have in defeating
efforts to desegregate the public schools." '45
Justice Stevens criticized both the Court's causation analysis and its invoca-
tion of separation of powers doctrine to bolster its holding. He viewed the issue
as whether plaintiffs had alleged that the government was "subsidiz[ing] the exo-
dus of white children from schools that would otherwise be racially inte-
grated." 46 He concluded that as a matter of "elementary economics," the cash
grants given to racially discriminatory schools by way of tax exemptions and
tax-deductible contributions made those schools more affordable and therefore
more popular.47 Justice Stevens further contended that the Court's separation
of powers argument had no relevance to the issue of standing. He acknowledged
that Wright raised legitimate concerns of justiciability and usurpation of execu-
tive discretion, but believed that the Court had only confused the issue of stand-
ing by failing to address those concerns directly.
The standing test applied by the Court in Wright is the product of a series
of decisions in the 1970s. These decisions first liberalized standing requirements
by replacing the legal-interest test with an injury-in-fact test, but later retreated
from this liberalization by tightening the causation requirement. 48 In Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.49 the Court rejected
its former legal-interest test 50 in favor of a two-pronged standing test. To have
standing under the new test a plaintiff was required to demonstrate injury-in-fact
and an interest to be protected that fell within the zone of interests safeguarded
by the statutory or constitutional provision under which he sought relief. Under
this liberal test persons living in an apartment complex had standing to chal-
lenge the landlord's exclusion of nonwhites as an infringement of their right to
interracial association;51 students who camped and hiked in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area had standing to challenge the approval of an increase in
railroad freight charges for recyclable goods as an injury to their right to enjoy
the environment;52 and persons who camped in national parks might have had
standing to challenge the commercial development of those parks as an infringe-
ment of their right to enjoy the environment. 53
As early as 1973, however, the Court signaled a retreat from these liberal
holdings by placing new emphasis on causation and strengthening the line of
45. Id. at 3337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 3342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 3344 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. See Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Re-
straint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 186-92 (1980-81).
49. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
50. The legal-interest test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate injury to a legally protected inter-
est to gain standing. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1938).
51. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
53. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Although plaintiffs in Sierra Club were denied
standing because the Club failed to allege that its members used the valley threatened by develop-
ment, the Court stated in dicta that such an allegation would have been sufficient basis for standing.
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causation required by article III.54 In Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 55 the Court held
that the mother of an illegitimate child did not have standing to challenge Texas
court decisions that construed a child support statute as applying only to mar-
ried parents. The Court reasoned that although a favorable ruling might allow
the State to prosecute the child's father for failure to pay support, it would not
ensure that the mother would receive support payments.5 6 Therefore, Linda
R.S.'s injury was not redressable.
The causation test was developed further by the Court in Warth v. Seldin.57
Plaintiffs in Warth were denied standing to challenge exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances that prevented the construction of low-cost housing and thus prevented
plaintiffs from finding suitable housing. The Court denied standing because of
its uncertainty that the relief desired would result from a favorable decision.
Altering the zoning rules, the Court stated, would not guarantee plaintiffs access
to housing.58
The requirement that the plaintiff's injury be "fairly traceable" to the de-
fendant's conduct became part of the Court's standing analysis in Simon v. East-
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.5 9 Plaintiffs in Simon were indigents
who had been denied nonemergency medical care at hospitals that enjoyed tax-
exempt status. The hospitals enjoyed this privilege because they were designated
"charitable" under revised IRS guidelines. 6° The challenged guidelines granted
hospitals charitable status even if they restricted admissions to paying patients
so long as the hospital offered full-time emergency treatment to anyone in need
of emergency care. Plaintiffs argued that the new guidelines injured them by
encouraging hospitals to deny treatment to indigents. The Court held that
plaintiffs' inability to receive medical care could not fairly be traced to the IRS's
revision of its guidelines because there was no evidence that the decision to deny
admission to indigents would have been different if the IRS had denied the hos-
pitals' charitable status. The Court believed it "purely speculative" that a
change in IRS guidelines would result in the admission of indigents. 6' As in
Linda R.S. and Warth, relief of the Simon plaintiffs' injury would depend in part
on the response of third parties to a favorable Court ruling; therefore, the causa-
tion requirement was not satisfied. "
The causation requirement, though harsh, has not presented an absolute
54. For an excellent article on the development of the causation requirement, see Nichol, supra
note 48.
55. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
56. Linda R.S. has been cited by Professor Tribe to illustrate a potential double standard in the
causation requirement. Professor Tribe notes that if the father of Linda R.S.'s child had brought an
action for a declaratory judgment, he would have had standing to challenge the statute. The basis
for his standing would have been the assumption that criminal sanctions change behavior-the very
assumption rejected by the Court in denying standing to Linda R.S. Professor Tribe concludes that
this result is "palpably unfair." L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 93.
57. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
58. Id. at 505-07.
59. 426 U.S. 26"(1976).
60. Prior guidelines did not consider hospitals charitable unless they provided as much care to
indigents as their financial resources allowed. Id. at 42.
61. Id.
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bar to plaintiffs who suffer an indirect injury. For example, in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group62 citizens alleging an injury to their envi-
ronment resulting from the operation of nuclear power plants were held to have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act.63 The
holding was based on evidence demonstrating that but for the Act, construction
of the nuclear facilities in plaintiffs' neighborhoods would not be completed.
64
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 65
plaintiff company was allowed standing to attack an exclusionary zoning scheme
because it could identify a specific project it intended to construct once the
scheme was removed. This allegation gave the complaint the" 'essential dimen-
sion of specificity'" the Court had found missing in Warth.66
There are also a number of cases in which the causation requirement has
been abbreviated or ignored. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village ofBellwood 67 the
village and some of its residents claimed that their right to the benefits of living
in an integrated society was being infringed by the racial steering practices of
certain real estate brokers. The Court upheld plaintiffs' claim without requiring
plaintiffs to show with specificity that the changing composition of their neigh-
borhood was the result of defendants' steering practices or that the composition
of the neighborhood would remain integrated if defendants ceased their steering
practices.
Standing requirements were not discussed in Norwood v. Harrison,68 in
which the Court held that the parents of school children were entitled to an
injunction prohibiting the State of Mississippi from providing free textbooks to
students attending racially discriminatory private schools. The issue whether
the parents had suffered a distinct injury, fairly traceable to the state's conduct
and redressable by the Court, was not addressed. Similarly, the Court made no
mention of article III standing requirements when it summarily affirmed the
grant of an injunction against the IRS in Green v. Coit.69
The Court's inconsistent application of its article III standing test, specifi-
cally the causation element of the test, has led to criticism that the Court em-
ploys standing analysis in an "unprincipled" effort to "screen from [its] docket
claims which [it] substantively disfavors."' 70 The Court's analysis in Wright
lends support to this criticism. 7 1
The Court's conclusion in Wright that government support of racially dis-
62. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of a nuclear power
company in the event of a nuclear accident. Id.
64. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74-77.
65. 429 U.S. 252 (1978).
66. Id. at 263 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)).
67. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
68. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
69. 404 U.S. 997 (1971), affig mem. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
70. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 93.
71. See Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also McCoy & Devins, supra
note 15, at 467 ("[I]f the Supreme Court. . . holds that the plaintiffs in Wright are without stand-
ing, it will be guilty of the ultimate irony.").
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criminatory private schools does not infringe on the rights of the blacks in the
neighborhoods where those schools exist ignores the constitutional right of
blacks to freedom from government supported segregation and its consequences.
In the Court's estimation plaintiffs' first injury72 alleged a general harm shared
by all blacks when the government discriminates on the basis of race. The Court
refused to recognize this stigmatic injury as a basis for standing because all
members of the racial group allegedly being discriminated against could claim
this type of injury. The Court also feared that such an injury could be made the
basis for third-party standing.73 This analysis reveals the Court's unwillingness
to read plaintiffs' complaint carefully. As Justice Brennan noted, "the com-
plaint. . . limits the claim of stigmatic injury from illegal government action to
black children attending public schools in districts that are currently desegre-
gating yet contain discriminatory private schools benefitting from illegal tax
exemptions." 74
There can be little doubt that when a government-supported racially dis-
criminatory private school exists beside an integrated public school in a neigh-
borhood undergoing desegregation, black school children continue to carry the
badge of inferiority that burdened them under a dual school system. The exist-
ence of this badge and its impact on black youngsters were recognized by the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education.75 In Brown the Court stated: "A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn" and "may affect [the
child's] heart and mind in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 76 "Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of negro children. . .. ,"77 The Court thus recognized
in Brown not only the right of black children to equal protection, but also their
right to be free of the consequences of government-supported discrimination in
education. The infringement of this right is at least as distinct, palpable, and
personal an injury as the aesthetic injury suffered by campers when the beauty of
72. The first injury alleged by plaintiffs was harm resulting from unconstitutional government
financial aid to racially discriminatory private schools. See supra text accompanying note 35.
73. For criticism of racial denigration as a basis for standing, see McCoy & Devins, supra note
15, at 447-53.
74. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3335 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated: "Thus, the
Court's 'parade of horribles' concerning black plaintiffs from Hawaii challenging tax exemptions
granted to schools in Maine, is completely irrelevant for purposes of Article III standing in this
action. Indeed, even if relevant, that criticism would go to the scope of the class certified. . . ." Id.
at 3335 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court also expressed concern that recognizing a stigmatic injury as a basis for standing
would confer standing nationwide on all members of the minority group against which the govern-
ment allegedly was discriminating. The Court, however, has not always been troubled by the
number of plaintiffs who may qualify to bring a particular cause of action. In United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court
specifically noted that the plaintiffs could not be deprived of standing simply because everyone who
used the "scenic resources of the country" could assert the same injury. Id. at 687-88. The Court
stated: "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be ques-
tioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion." Id. at 688.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. Id. at 494.
77. Id.
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the places where they camp is diminished. 78
The Court did not reject completely the validity of this injury, but it held
that such an injury could confer standing only on persons who allege a personal
denial of equal treatment. Each of the cases cited by the Court as support for
this conclusion, however, involved plaintiffs whose complaints sought to compel
defendants to afford equal protection to parties not before the Court.79 This
situation did not exist in Wright because plaintiffs alleged a direct injury to
themselves, not a denial of the rights of others.
The complaint in Wright posed a unique question: Can government be held
accountable for perpetuating the injuries suffered by blacks when the govern-
ment endorses their treatment as second class citizens? The Court held in
Wright that the government is accountable only for those injuries caused by its
own denial of equal treatment and not for the injuries caused when it facilitates
discrimination by private organizations. This holding unfairly and unreasonably
limits the class of "distinct and palpable" injuries the Court is willing to redress.
The Court's refusal to grant standing on the basis of the second injury8"
alleged in Wright is unjustifiable. The Court in Wright applied the causation
element of its standing test far more strenuously than article III demands and
consequently left meritorious plaintiffs without relief. It ruled that the second
injury failed to satisfy the causation element of its standing test because plain-
tiffs' complete relief would be dependent on the response of third parties to the
Court's ruling. This decision insulates the government from liability for having
indirectly supported third parties in the commission of acts that the government
cannot lawfully support directly.81 Although the Court recognized that interfer-
ence with the racial balance of public schools infringes on the right of children in
78. These were the facts in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The Court recognized in SCRAP that this injury was a suffi-
cient basis for standing. Id. at 686-87. For further discussion of the facts in SCRAP, see infra text
accompanying notes 91-92.
79. The Court cited Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974); and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Moose Lodge the Court held that
a black plaintiff who had not sought and did not intend to seek membership in the lodge did not have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lodge's discriminatory membership policies, even
though he had alleged that the lodge's actions constituted "state action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Plaintiffhad not alleged any injury to himself resulting from the lodge's membership policies
and thus was attempting to assert the right of other blacks to be equally considered for membership.
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 165-71.
In O'Shea plaintiffs sought to challenge the discriminatory administration of criminal justice in
Cairo, Illinois. Although plaintiffs purported to represent a class that included persons who had
suffered discriminatory treatment, none of the named plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered or were
threatened with such treatment. Therefore, they failed to allege any injury to themselves resulting
from the county's discriminatory practices. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95.
Plaintiffs in Rizzo sought injunctive relief for violations of the civil rights of Philadelphia citi-
zens by city policemen. The Court determined that plaintiffs had failed to present a case or contro-
versy because the threat of any future injury to plaintiffs was too remote. Therefore, the Court held
that plaintiffs lacked a stake in the outcome sufficient to confer standing. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73.
80. The second injury alleged by plaintiffs was that the federal tax exemptions to racially dis-
criminatory private schools in their communities impaired their children's ability to attend desegre-
gated public schools. See supra text accompanying note 35.
81. Other authors have noted that the Court's application of the causation requirement has had
the effect of insulating the government from liability for contributing to the injury of plaintiffs. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97; Nichol, supra note 48, at 223.
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public schools to receive an education in an integrated environment, it con-
cluded that the causal relationship between infringement of this right and gov-
ernment support of racially discriminatory schools was "attenuated at best."'82
Plaintiffs alleged that the tax exemptions given to racially discriminatory private
schools "foster[ed] and encourage[d] the organization, operation, and expan-
sion" of racially discriminatory schools and interfered with the desegregation of
public schools, 83 but the Court found their pleading defective because it failed to
allege that "there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving
tax exemptions in [plaintiffs'] communities for withdrawal of those exemptions
to make an appreciable difference in public-school integration."'8 4 Under this
reasoning plaintiffs were required to allege not only that the government's con-
duct interfered with public school desegregation, but also that eliminating the
conduct would have a major impact on public school integration.
To require this type of specificity in pleading revives past notions of fact
pleading and forces plaintiffs to prove their cases on the merits to survive mo-
tions to dismiss. 85 Requiring plaintiffs to show more than a line of causation
such that a favorable decision would "contribute in a significant manner to rem-
edying or preventing the injury alleged" goes beyond the article III causation
requirement. 86 Article III requires only that the courts avoid rendering gratui-
tous judgments by ensuring that plaintiffs allege an injury that is "fairly" or
reasonably traceable to the defendant's conduct and that the court's ruling is
"likely" to result in relief.87 Plaintiffs' allegation in Wright that tax exemptions
facilitated the activities of racially discriminatory private schools and thereby
diminished the ability of their children to receive an education in an integrated
school satisfied this requirement.
The government grants tax exemptions for the very purpose of promoting
the activities of the institutions that are exempted.88 The exemptions make it
82. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
83. Id. at 3322.
84. Id. at 3328 (emphasis added). Surprisingly, the Court failed to recognize the importance of
tax-exempt status to the financial viability of many private schools. Although tax-exempt income
status is of little benefit to a school that earns little or no profit, eligibility for tax deductible contribu-
tions is a valuable asset. Because charitable contributions are deductible from taxable income, they
cost less than contributions to other organizations. For example, a person in a 35% tax bracket can
make a $100 contribution with only a $65 loss in disposable income. See Feldstein, The Income Tax
and Charitable Contributions" Part I-Aggregate and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 81
(1975).
85. Justice Brennan has noted that the Court may be creating a doctrine which includes consti-
tutionally mandated fact pleading. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 55 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result) ( "[B]y requiring that 'this line of causation'. . . be precisely and intricately elaborated in
the complaint, the Court continues its recent policy of 'reverting to the form of fact pleading long
abjured in the federal courts.'" (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 528)). One commentator also has
expressed alarm at this possible development. See Nichol, supra note 48, at 195; cf. L. TRiBE, supra
note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97 (criticizing the specificity of pleading the Court said would be required to
satisfy standing in Warth).
86. Nichol, supra note 48, at 226.
87. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
88. Tax exemptions and charitable deductions are means of federal assistance and are constitu-
tionally equivalent to direct financial aid. "They serve ends. . . similar in nature to those served
. . . by direct government expenditures .... " Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARv.
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less expensive for the institution to operate and allow donors to contribute larger
sums by making their contributions tax deductible.89 By making the activity of
these schools less expensive, the government makes them more affordable. Basic
economic theory demonstrates that if an activity is more affordable more people
will engage in it.90 To the extent that tax exemptions allow racially discrimina-
tory private schools to charge less tuition or provide better services, the govern-
ment's unlawful activity aids in increasing the enrollments of such schools and
diminishes the opportunity for children to attend integrated public schools.
This line of causation, though rejected by the Court, hardly seems less di-
rect or more attenuated than that accepted by the Court in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).91 In SCRAP
plaintiffs alleged that an increase in freight charges for recyclable waste would
result in an increased use of raw materials, the natural resources for which
might come from the Washington, D.C., area. They alleged that this increased
use would diminish their ability to enjoy the environment in which they camped
and hiked. The Court accepted these allegations as a sufficient basis for stand-
ing. Although the government argued that the Court should limit standing to
those who were "significantly" affected by the challenged conduct, the Court
refused stating: "[E]ven if we could begin to define what such a test would
mean, we think it fundamentally misconceived. . . . 'The basic idea. . . is that
an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of princi-
ple. . . ,,, 92 This "fundamentally misconceived" standard, however, is pre-
cisely the test adopted by the Court in Wright.
The Court suggested that plaintiffs' injury was not redressable because it
was "purely speculative" whether withdrawal of tax exemptions would affect
public school integration and because redressing plaintiffs' injury would require
violation of separation of powers doctrine. Although plaintiffs probably could
not have offered evidence as to the exact number of white students who would
return to the public schools once the tax exemptions were removed, it does not
follow that the relief they sought was unlikely to flow from a favorable deci-
sion.93 Plaintiffs sought relief for their children's diminished opportunity to re-
L. REv. 352, 354 (1970); see Allen v. Wright, 104 U.S. at 3343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The pur-
pose of [tax exemptions], like the purpose of any subsidy, is to promote the activity subsidized; the
statutes 'seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations
through the grant of tax benefits.' " (quoting Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2026 n. 10)); McCoy & Devins,
supra note 15, at 454-55 & n.71.
89. See supra note 84.
90. See Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3344-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
92. Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601,
613 (1968)).
93. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), Justice
Brennan posed in his concurrence what he thought was a purely rhetorical question:
We may properly wonder where the Court, armed with its "fatally speculative plead-
ings" tool will strike next.... Will minority schoolchildren now have to plead and show
that in the absence of illegal governmental "encouragement" of private segregated schools,
such schools would not "elect to forgo" their favorable tax treatment, and that this will
"result in the availability" to complainants of an integrated educational system?
Simon, 426 U.S. at 63 ( Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan mistakenly believed that the
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ceive an education in an integrated school. If tax exemptions for racially
discriminatory private schools had been withdrawn, three factors could have
been expected to lead to an increase in the enrollment of white students in public
schools. First, fewer racially discriminatory schools would have been estab-
lished because the absence of the tax exemptions would have made it more diffi-
cult for such schools to solicit necessary contributions from corporations and
individuals. 9 4 Second, schools then in existence, particularly those with little or
no endowment, would have been more likely to cease operations.95 As one
study has demonstrated, educational institutions are quite vulnerable to loss of
income resulting from the increased cost of donations when tax incentives to
contributors are withdrawn. 96 Last, fewer white students would have been able
to afford the cost of discriminatory schools as the loss of contributions and the
tax on revenues made attendance more expensive. These factors, which are
based on elementary economic theory, make it unlikely that the withdrawal of
tax exemptions could have failed to have an impact on public school integration.
The separation-of-powers analysis applied by the Court also fails to support
the Court's conclusion that the article III standing requirements were not satis-
fied. The idea of separation of powers traditionally is relevant to the jus-
ticiability of issues raised by the plaintiff, not to the plaintiff's standing to bring
an action.97 The Court feared that allowing standing in Wright to challenge
administrative guidelines "would pave the way generally for suits challenging
. . . the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obliga-
tions."'98 This fear, however, focuses on whether the Court should grant the
relief requested, not on whether the plaintiff has presented a case or controversy
under article III.
The Court's concern with avoiding undue interference with the executive's
discretion in enforcing the laws was appropriate because the administrative pro-
cedures of a government agency were challenged. This concern, however, has
no relevance to a discussion of standing. Further, as Justice Stevens observed,
the discretion given the executive "does not apply when suit is brought 'to en-
Court's summary affirmance of Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), had answered this question.
Simon, 426 U.S. at 63 n.ll. Although mistaken as to how the Court would answer his question,
Justice Brennan demonstrated some skill in predicting what issues the Court would confront in the
future.
94. Martin Feldstein has conducted a study which concludes that gifts to educational institu-
tions are quite sensitive to the cost of giving. He predicts that an elimination of the charitable
deduction would reduce donations to educational institutions by at least 50%. Feldstein, The In-
come Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II-The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other
Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 224 (1975).
95. See Note, Bob Jones University v. United States: Paying the Price of Prejudice-Loss of Tax
Exempt Status, 35 MERCER L. REv. 937, 958 (1984); see also Coffey v. State Edue. Fin. Comm'n,
296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (1969) (per curiamn) (private schools formed in response to public school
desegregation operate on the "thinnest financial basis").
96. See supra note 94.
97. See Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3345-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The question whether a partic-
ular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of
powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of
the Federal Government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
98. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3329.
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force specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm.' "99
The Court's analysis in support of its conclusion that Norwood v. Harri-
son 100 and Colt v. Green 10 1 are distinguishable from Wright adds to the confu-
sion and harshness of its opinion and gives rise to further criticism. In Norwood
parents of schoolchildren successfully challenged Mississippi's provision of free
textbooks to students attending racially discriminatory schools. Because stand-
ing was not specifically discussed in Norwood, the Court in Wright relied on a
footnote in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery'0 2 to explain the basis for standing in
Norwood: "The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation or-
der and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they
suffered." 10 3  The Court inferred from this footnote that plaintiffs in Norwood
had acquired a right to have the State steer clear of supporting a dual educa-
tional system through a school desegregation decree and concluded that Wright
was distinguishable as its plaintiffs had not acquired any such injunctive
rights. 10 4
Mississippi's support of racially discriminatory schools by supplying them
free textbooks is analogous to the federal government's support of such schools
through tax exemptions. It hardly seems possible that the "concrete injury"
suffered by plaintiffs in Norwood differed significantly from the injury suffered by
plaintiffs in Wright. Despite the assertion by the Court that the rights of the
plaintiffs in Norwood were derived from a judicial decree, the Norwood opinion
makes it clear that plaintiffs' right to relief was derived from the Constitution:
"A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operat-
ing the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving signifi-
cant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination." 10 5
The Court struggled even more in differentiating standing in Green from
standing in Wright. First, the Court stated that since Green was "merely a sum-
mary affirmance" of a lower court holding that did not include a ruling on the
issue of standing, its affirmance "lack[ed] the precedential weight of a case in-
volving a truly adversary controversy."' I 6 Second, the Court stated that Green
was distinguishable from Wright on its facts because Green concerned only Mis-
sissippi's public schools and evidence from an earlier Mississippi case had made
it clear that tax support to racially discriminatory schools was having a signifi-
cant impact on public school desegregation.10 7 Last, the Court asserted that the
"history of school desegregation in Mississippi at the time of the [Green] litiga-
tion, the nature of the IRS conduct challenged at the outset of the litigation, and
99. Id. at 3347 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from the majority opinion, id. at 3330).
100. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
101. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
102. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
103. Id. at 570-71 n.10; Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3331.
104. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3331.
105. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467.
106. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3332.
107. The case referred to was Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss.
1969) (per curiam), in which plaintiffs successfully challenged Mississippi's grant of tuition tax cred-
its to parents who sent their children to racially discriminatory private schools.
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the District Court's particular findings, .. amply distinguish[ed]" Green from
Wright. '0 8
Justice Brennan's dissent raised the obvious question to this line of reason-
ing: How do these factors, specified by the Court as distinguishing Green from
Wright, bear on the issue of standing? Although Wright was a nationwide class
action and Green was limited to Mississippi, this distinction fails to show how
the injury suffered by plaintiffs in Wright was less distinct and palpable, less
traceable to the defendants' unlawful conduct, or less likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision than the injury suffered by plaintiffs in Green. The scope of a
class action is not relevant to the issue of standing.'0 9 If a history of reluctance
to desegregate public schools is relevant at all to the issue of standing, it "weighs
in favor of allowing [plaintiffs in Wright] to maintain their . . . lawsuit"; 1 10
plaintiffs alleged that the IRS guidelines they challenged contributed to the
"substantial continuation of the onerous history of school segregation in the af-
fected school districts."'
That IRS policy at the time of the Wright litigation differed from IRS pol-
icy at the time of the Green litigation also fails to provide a basis for distinguish-
ing the two cases on the issue of standing." 2 Plaintiffs in Wright alleged that
IRS policy was "so ineffective as to be the functional equivalent" of the govern-
ment's policy at the time of Green.' '3 The Court's use of the finding of the
district court in Green that tax exemptions were important to racially discrimi-
natory schools as a factor in denying standing to similarly situated plaintiffs who
had never had the opportunity to present such evidence to the court made a
"mockery of the standing inquiry."" 4 The Green court's factual findings
strengthen the allegations made by plaintiffs in Wright and support a finding
that plaintiffs had standing. As Justice Brennan noted, the Court's discussion of
the distinctions between Wright and Green "stretches the imagination beyond its
breaking point."' "
5
The most serious consequence of the Court's decision in Wright, however,
is that it sterilizes the Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United
States." 6 In Bob Jones the Supreme Court determined that sections 501(c)(3)
and 170 of the Code prohibit the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory schools and from allowing donations to such schools to be
considered tax deductible. Wright illustrates that the IRS may escape challenge
108. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3332-33.
109. See id. at 3340 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3341 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. IRS policy at the time of the Green litigation granted tax-exempt status to racially discrimi-
natory schools. IRS policy at the time of the Wright litigation purported to deny tax-exempt status
to such schools. See supra note 1.
113. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3340 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). For an analysis and criticism of the Court's failure to reach the
constitutional issues raised in Bob Jones, see Note, Religious Schools, Public Policy, and the Constitu-
tion: Bob Jones University v. United States, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1051 (1984).
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on grounds that it is violating these provisions by merely giving lip service to
the Bob Jones ruling; if the IRS did grant tax-exempt status to Bob Jones Uni-
versity or some other racially discriminatory school, no plaintiff would have
standing under the Court's holding in Wright to challenge the IRS's conduct.
The Court in essence has left the government free to accomplish indirectly what
it is forbidden to do directly.1 17
The Court in Wright used causation doctrine as a hammer to knock the
teeth out of Bob Jones and shatter the value of Norwood and Green as precedent
on the issue of standing. Standing doctrine remains shrouded in confusion and
controversy; any court desiring to do so will be able to use the doctrine as its
vehicle for avoiding decisions on the merits of cases in which government con-
duct is challenged. Although the Court purported to distinguish Wright from
similar cases in which the Court has recognized the standing of the parties, the
Court in fact imposed a harsher test of standing in Wright than it previously had
imposed. The causation standard applied by the Court in Wright exceeds the
scope of the article III requirements and unduly impairs access to the courts by
victims of unlawful goverment conduct. The Court's opinion "'"slam[s] the
courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their
claims on the merits" ' "118 and leaves the government free to lend substantial
support to racially discriminatory institutions.
TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH
117. If the government desired to avoid the constitutional requirement that schools be inte-
grated, providing support to racially discriminatory private schools certainly would be among its
chosen methods. The Court's holding in Wright condones this conduct.
118. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result and dissenting))).
1032 [Vol. 63
